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Dave Eggers is probably best known for his ironic playfulness and his 
preoccupation with middle-class US adolescence, so his sincere treat-
ment of genocide in Sudan in his novel, What is the What (2006), the 
product of his collaboration with Valentino Achak Deng, at first seems 
a somewhat surprising departure. The novel, although it marks a shift 
in Eggers’s style of narration, retains his faith in the enduring signifi-
cance of childhood. More significant is Eggers’s intervention into the 
construction and function of literature and the relationship of literature 
to nationalist identities through the text’s juxtaposition of exile across 
Africa and exile within the US. Of course, literature has always played 
an important role in the production of nationalisms, among other forms 
of communal and individual identity. Nor are narratives testifying to 
or documenting human suffering something new. Even the collabora-
tive process Eggers employs has precedence in the testimonio—docu-
ments created by Western academics and Central American political 
activists record the injustice underlying revolutions in Central America. 
What makes What is the What innovative is the playful flexibility Eggers 
applies to the boundaries of genre and authorship and the space his 
experimentation with novel, biography, and testimony creates for cos-
mopolitan collaboration between writers, readers, and speakers of wildly 
different racial, social, and political status.1 
What is the What, although marketed as a novel and titled an au-
tobiography, more closely resembles a testimony narrative. Testimony 
narratives are collaborative acts involving a speaker who has witnessed 
injustice and violence and an academic or other professional writer in 
order to raise awareness in US or European readers.2 Their mediated 
presentation of injustice demand further action on the part of a reading 
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audience otherwise far removed from conflict by boundaries of nation-
ality, race, class, and gender by merit of the events described and the 
global inequality implied by the need for its speaker to seek mediation. 
Most critics theorize the genre as limited to Central American politi-
cal struggles to the exclusion of narratives produced in other parts of 
the world.3 However, because political struggles are global and ongo-
ing, and because collaborative narratives continue to emerge from them, 
the testimonial genre has the potential to fulfill a critical need in the 
development of a cosmopolitan society, with its explicit appeals for su-
pranational human rights advocacy and transnational, micropolitical 
humanitarian action. Reconfiguring the testimony genre, and literature 
more broadly, as an ethically motivated cosmopolitan engagement with 
difference attributes to literature a materially productive function and 
expands its relevance beyond the constraints of any specific territorial or 
national boundary. Eggers’s use of testimonial narrative is a powerful ex-
ample of this potential for literature to engage in cosmopolitan activism.
To argue this point, I describe the generic qualities of and objections 
to testimonial narratives. I examine the grounds for charges against the 
testimony genre via an analysis of Elizabeth Burgos-Debray’s construc-
tion of I Rigoberta Menchú. Burgos-Debray uses her text to argue that her 
text understands Menchú and that this understanding enables Western 
readers to empathize with the suffering of all indigenous people. I then 
contrast Burgos-Debray’s methodology with Eggers’s. In What is the 
What, Eggers actively forces the recognition that he and Deng worked 
collaboratively and places Deng in control of any economic or political 
power the text’s success might garner. Eggers’s novel, because it carefully 
avoids the tendencies of US representations of foreign nationals to stray 
into paternalistic descriptions more invested in promoting feelings of 
superiority and to position the US as a model source for aid to a trou-
bled world to be copied by others, offers a positive model for the testi-
mony narrative as a form of cosmopolitan humanitarian collaboration.
I. Testimonial Narrative as Cosmopolitan Text
Testimonies generally document the life of a single individual in first-
person, but differ significantly from other forms of life writing in the 
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role their central figures play. Whereas biographies assume the signifi-
cance of the individual and individual accomplishments and have the 
aim of replicating the values and behaviors of their subjects in readers, 
testimonies efface the ego of their central narrative consciousness as they 
proceed to material conditions with implications beyond the boundaries 
of any single self or community. “Autobiographies,” Georg Gugelberger 
and Michael Kearney suggest, “are writings by selves which are impressed 
by their own unique significance” (9). The same can perhaps be said 
of fictional forms of life writing. What matters to writers and readers 
of biography is the development of an exceptional individual, not the 
description of an exceptional situation worthy of the reader’s attention. 
Biography establishes an initial relationship of moral difference to the 
reader by treating the unique accomplishments of an individual subject 
as the products of superior individual behaviors.4 The biography sug-
gests its subject as a model for ideal development while simultaneously 
fostering an Andersonian imagined bond between the subject, a com-
munity, and the reader. Through successful reform, or imaginative iden-
tification, the biography’s threat of difference and exclusion shifts to an 
embrace of readers who come to recognize or impose coincidence with 
the subject. This bond is suited to nationalist projects because it directs 
readers’ imagined affinities between themselves and the subject toward 
inward reconfiguration of self-identity without necessarily encouraging 
intervention or even participation in the political or economic opera-
tion of either their assumed community or its others. Testimony reading 
proceeds along different lines. A reader may perceive admirable qualities 
in the speaker of a testimony, but the primary consequence of reading 
is not identification. Instead, reading forces the recognition of unsightly 
conditions otherwise hidden from view beyond their immediate milieu. 
The practice of testimony reading recalls Bhabha’s notion of unhomeli-
ness, with its publication of uncomfortable difference. The unhomely 
reveals a boundary between insiders and outsiders but also that the ideas 
contained on both sides of this boundary exist in a state of constant com-
mute (Bhabha 13, 5). This state of interchange is compounded in the case 
of testimony narratives since, as Kate Douglass suggests, readers become 
a second-person witness to the text’s traumatic events and “in this act 
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of reading, the second person sanctions and empowers the testimony” 
(149). The recognition of the disparity and injustice the enforcement of 
such a boundary requires suggests a reevaluation of the values determin-
ing boundaries of communities and the flow of resources across them 
and transfers attention from the buttressing of national identity toward 
cosmopolitan, collaborative projects of limited duration and scope.
Unlike legal testimony, which derives authority from an assumed exact 
correspondence with a single testifying individual’s experience, testimo-
nial narratives gain meaning and authority to the extent that they create a 
flexible portrait of an entire community or culture.5 Robert Carr observes 
that testimonies “tak[e] on value as capital in the fund for agendas of na-
tional reconceptualization” not exclusively because narrated individuals 
claim representative status, although they often do, but because academ-
ics “assume an easy metonymic relationship between the subject of testi-
monial and the ethnic group from which she or he comes” (157). When 
texts constructed allegorically are published, Carr argues, they “celebrate 
the reader’s ignorance as the group is conversely constituted as infinite 
duplicates of the ‘original’ subject presented in the pages of the testimo-
nial” (157).6 Metonymic readings become a limitation to testimony nar-
ratives when the presence of the supposedly objective writer becomes too 
successfully effaced from the narrative text or conflated with the first-per-
son voice of the narrator, an effect Kimberley Nance describes as fusion. 
If, as Douglass suggests, testimony narratives rely upon a second-person 
reader to validate the experiences they record through the act of reading 
and subsequently, of empathizing, the merit of such experiences lies in 
their ability to provoke the proper reaction in a remote audience. While 
the production of empathy for suffering individuals is an admirable goal, 
such means of attaining this response are not entirely satisfactory for the 
purposes of testimonial narrative, which is concerned with action rather 
than validation or identification. As Sharon Crowley points out, read-
ers forming opinions of a traumatic text “interpret [their] emotional 
response,” or the empathy Douglass cites, “imagined or actual—as ex-
perience, thus conflating [their] beliefs with ‘reality’”(84). Equating the 
perspectives of writer and narrator allows the writer as he or she hears a 
testimony and later “the reader to move from address to a shared sub-
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ject position,” to find their situation is like that of the narrator, and to 
evade the need to intervene in a cause or alter personal beliefs (Nance, 
“Disarming Testimony” 573). The conventions of testimony narrative 
assume a narrator sacrifices the integrity of his or her personal experi-
ence in order to more fully relate communal concerns and to describe an 
exceptional situation, not an individual, worthy of the reader’s attention 
and action. Testimony narratives’ use of a metonymic representative of 
collective identity discourages voyeuristic readings and misplaced iden-
tification with their narrators, both effects that if left unaddressed would 
enable the reader to escape an ethical commitment to act (Braebeck 255).
As an agent of the community, the narrator of a cosmopolitically ori-
ented testimony, like Deng in What is the What, appeals to the reader to 
intervene in a specific political cause without requiring the identifica-
tion or emulation that biography encourages. The demand for active re-
lationships among disparate peoples distinguishes the genre from other 
literary forms depicting or speaking for others. Applying cosmopolitan 
practice to the testimony narrative reimagines the relationship between 
members of differing national communities such that the national other 
is not so much a point of contrast one uses to form the boundaries of 
his or her own identity, but a collaborative partner in the ongoing narra-
tive process of identity construction. Cosmopolitan testimony makes its 
readers aware of injustice and burdens them, as members of a markedly 
different and frequently more privileged community, to act in collabora-
tion with the narrator in a political project, creating a momentary cos-
mopolitan perspective that supersedes and exceeds national affiliations. 
II. I Rigoberta Menchú and Misappropriation of Voice
Without doubt, the most well known testimony narrative is I Rigoberta 
Menchú (1983), created in collaboration between Menchú, the Maya-
Quiche activist and anthropologist, Elizabeth Burgos-Debray. Although 
already well known, when Stanford included the text in its required 
Western Civilization courses, I Rigoberta Menchú became the canon-
ized exemplar of the testimony narrative. Indeed, it is difficult to find a 
discussion of testimony that does not address Menchú. While Menchú’s 
and Burgos-Debray’s narrative does fit the generic qualities of testimony 
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narrative, the circumstances of its production, particularly the rela-
tionship Burgos-Debray constructs between herself and Menchú, and 
herself and readers in her introduction, undermines the cosmopolitan 
spirit of collaboration. Instead the result is a sense of competition for 
the authority to address a Western audience. Following the book’s pub-
lication, the relationship between the two deteriorated to the point that 
Menchú denounced her collaborator entirely. If public infighting were 
not enough, the book became the subject of an infamous debate in the 
late 1990s when anthropologist David Stoll accused Menchú of fabri-
cating elements of her testimony.7 
While the political challenges to the veracity of Menchu’s account are 
dubious, Burgos-Debray’s role in the text’s production is more worthy of 
critique. In her introduction, Burgos-Debray notes that when she tran-
scribed her interviews with Menchú, “nothing was left out, not a word” 
(xix). However, she confesses slightly later that she “had to insert linking 
passages if the manuscript was to read like a monologue” and that this 
has been done silently (xx). These supplementary materials are entirely 
the product of her imagination and their extent remains otherwise un-
disclosed. Despite her admission that even after working with Menchú, 
she has “never studied Maya-Quiche culture” or “done field-work in 
Guatemala,” Burgos-Debray contends that her elaborations in no way 
alter the substance of Menchú’s narrative and that her lack of familiarity 
with the country in no way limits her ability to formulate such passages 
or to speak for the desires and demands of all Guatemalan Mayans (xix). 
Like many testimony narrators, Menchú begins by explaining that her 
story is “not only my life, it’s also the testimony of my people” and that 
it is important for readers to realize “that what has happened to me has 
happened to many other people too: My story is the story of all poor 
Guatemalans. My personal experience is the reality of a whole people” 
(1). The universalism of this statement is the source of much of the 
controversy surrounding Menchú. Within the context of the testimonio, 
however, her claim takes on a different valence than the factual equiva-
lence testimony ordinarily implies. She is her people’s representative and 
her experience evokes, but does not encompass or exhaust, the reality 
of many others.8 Burgos-Debray affirms Menchú’s claim, but treats her 
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narrative as a juridical document corresponding exactly to her individual 
experience. Where Menchú champions the cause of poor indigenous 
Guatemalans, Burgos-Debray, in her introduction, claims that “the 
voice of Rigoberta Menchú,” a textual entity she had a hand in creating, 
and rather than Menchú, herself, “allows the defeated to speak,” and that 
“she speaks for all the Indians of the American continent” (xi). Burgos-
Debray describes herself as acting as no more than a passive receptacle 
of experience during the interview process, “Rigobeta’s listener” and “her 
instrument, her double” but her active interpretation of Menchú effaces 
the existence of an entire hemisphere full of ethnic groups (xx). She 
implies here, that she is entirely unbiased, neutral, and just as good as a 
substitute to the reader for actual contact with Menchú, who in turn, is a 
substitute for contact with the people she claims to represent and further 
still for the people Burgos-Debray claims Menchú represents.
In the years following the publication of I, Rigoberta Menchú, Burgos-
Debray’s desire to claim ownership of the text’s and Menchú’s success 
has become more evident. Despite plans to transfer royalties to Menchú, 
Burgos-Debray, initially citing financial technicalities and later their 
falling-out, has apparently kept all income from the book’s various edi-
tions (Burgos 59). When Menchú rewrote her story with a new team of 
collaborators after winning the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize, Burgos-Debray 
responded by disparaging Menchú’s ability to narrate her experience. 
Of the second book, she indignantly writes, “[Rigoberta] has limited 
herself to producing a mirror image, taking the first book as a model 
with the sole object of supplanting it … [it] is a pallid reflection that 
does not withstand comparison” to her original text (60). Contradicting 
earlier affectations of selfless, self-effacing listening, Burgos-Debray here 
expresses her desire to be Menchú’s mouthpiece, providing, but also lim-
iting, access between Menchú and Western audiences. 
Burgos-Debray clearly played a role in the production of Menchú’s 
narrative and has self-serving interests in her connection to the text’s ma-
terial success. The violence Burgos-Debray commits against Menchú in 
her effort to transform her into a narrated identity is by no means unique. 
Within politically powerful societies, there is the tendency to conflate an 
inability to accurately narrate one’s own traumatic experiences with the 
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authenticity of victimhood, hence necessitating intervention on the part 
of activist academics. Slavoj Žižek usefully describes this tendency aris-
ing from the unexamined assumption that “the very factual deficiencies 
of the traumatised subject’s report on her experience bear witness to the 
truthfulness of her report, since they signal that the reported content 
‘contaminated’ the manner of reporting it” (4). His account of the narra-
tion of violence reveals the consequence that our process of recognition 
deliberately prevents unsightly victims from contributing to the narra-
tion of any national identity. David Jefferess makes a similar claim about 
framing humanitarian benevolence in terms of global citizenship. Global 
citizenship, he argues, requires “an Other who needs to be known, un-
derstood, and ultimately uplifted or saved” (31). The benevolent actor’s 
insistence upon disparity as a component for global action “mask[s] the 
material relationships that produce some as privileged, and hence ca-
pable of being active global citizens, and some as in need of support” 
(31). Burgos-Debray’s treatment of Menchú allows her to serve as an 
emblem for ethnic vengeance or justification for the intellectual domi-
nation of dehumanized others, but does not concede to her the ability 
to adequately narrate her condition, history, or to reconstruct a stable, 
cohesive identity. As the inability to articulate and live an independent 
identity in a culturally oppressive state was the source of Menchú’s frus-
tration, Burgos-Debray’s perhaps inadvertent mistreatment of Menchú 
simply mirrors the conditions she sought to speak out against.
Inderpal Grewal indicts human rights discourse, particularly European 
and US narratives, for exploiting the image of suffering, and for arousing 
the desire to intervene abroad in order to further establish the dominance 
of their own nationalisms within inter- or transnational space (158). She 
writes, “the very concept of the ‘international’ as a neutral or suprana-
tional space has maintained the link between the geopolitics of a univer-
sal human rights negotiated unequally between powerful states … and 
the biopolitics of a cosmopolitan, humanitarian self concerned with the 
welfare of untold populations of poor, disenfranchised women” (161). 
Grewal goes on to argue that “dominant representations of human rights 
discourse in refuge asylum constructed Europe and North America as 
the primary destination of refugees and thus as primary ‘havens’ that 
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‘protect’ those escaping human rights violations” (168). Human rights 
literature therefore limits rights by enforcing the “American role as the 
world’s policeman” (171). Burgos-Debray’s rhetorical justification of her 
act of speaking for Menchú conforms neatly to Grewal’s description of 
humanitarian discourse. Although Burgos-Debray may have initially had 
good intentions, her representation of Menchú manages to exemplify 
nearly every pitfall of the testimony genre. 
While writers must exercise discretion and sensitivity as they present 
the voices of their subaltern witnesses, it is still far better to speak out 
on their behalf than to leave injustices against subaltern groups un-
acknowledged. As Linda Alcoff puts it, an unquestioned prohibition 
against speaking for others “assumes that an individual can retreat into 
her discrete location and make claims entirely and singularly within that 
location that do not range over others” (108). Assuming such insularity 
further enables one to assume “that I am unconnected to others in my 
authentic self or that I can achieve an autonomy from others” with the 
“sole effect of allowing me to avoid responsibility and accountability for 
my effects on others” (Alcoff 108).9 Likewise, Beck insists on a cosmo-
politan commitment to dialogue with difference, arguing that an im-
posed “incommensurability … between cultures” releases “one from the 
labour of dialogue, leading with a degree of inevitability to imperialism 
and the clash of civilizations” (143). Testimony narratives, when con-
structed judiciously and compassionately, because they force readerly 
recognition or concession of the speaker’s equality and the formation of 
an active political-economic collaboration, creates a discursive practice 
with which one may speak for another in a more acceptable way.10 The 
task of inspiring politically and economically privileged readers to move 
beyond passive empathy for the oppressed to activism remains an im-
portant one. Indeed, despite Burgos-Debray’s failings as a collaborator, 
Menchú’s testimony has done a great deal to raise awareness in the US 
of political conditions in Guatemala.
III. What is the What and Transnational Collaboration
Dave Eggers’s What is the What offers a potential counter to Burgos-
Debray’s failure and creates a more balanced relationship between writer, 
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narrator, and readers. Like most testimony writers, Eggers’s stated goal 
is to “[empower] those most closely affected by contemporary social 
injustice” specifically by using “oral history” to “depict human rights 
crises in the United States and around the world” (Eggers 2009; 348).11 
However, Eggers’s book differs from typical testimony narratives by 
moving beyond simply reporting injustice to a reading audience in the 
hope that awareness will lead to ideological change to directly funding 
aid organizations. All profits from the first edition of What is the What, 
for which Eggers assumed all financial risk by publishing it with his 
press, McSweeny’s, and all future author’s proceeds, fund development 
initiatives in Sudan through a nonprofit organization that Deng over-
sees independently (Eggers, Zeitoun 539; The Valentino Achak Deng 
Foundation website). Further, Eggers and Deng contest the notion that 
the US is socially and politically superior to Sudan by continually re-
turning to images of Deng’s ongoing persecution within the US.
Since Eggers’s What is the What follows the life of a single individual, 
Valentino Achak Deng, and does so in order to engage readers in a larger 
cause, it is vulnerable to metonymic readings. However, Eggers employs 
a collaborative methodology that actively discourages the simplistic sort 
of allegorization that Carr describes and that Burgos-Debray’s claims 
encourage. Unlike most testimonials, and despite its subtitle, “The 
Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng,” What is the What is mar-
keted as a novel, not nonfiction. The word, autobiography, in Eggers’s 
lexicon signals the impossibility of objective or accurate description of 
the consciousness of self or other. He approaches his own memoir, A 
Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius (2000) with similar reserva-
tions.12 As he explains on that book’s copyright page, it is a work of 
fiction “in that in many cases, the author could not remember the exact 
words said by certain people” but immediately undermines this assertion 
by claiming ironically that he “had no imagination whatsoever for those 
sorts of things and could not conceive of making up a story or characters” 
anyhow. In the book’s preface, he suggests that instead of contemplating 
the philosophical complexities of nonfiction, readers ought to simply 
“Pretend it’s fiction” or insert their own names in place of his, that his life 
“can be about you! You and your pals!” (xxi, xxii). Although lighthearted, 
159
The  Vo i c e s  o f  Othe r s
Eggers evokes the tendency of readers to reconstruct imaginatively real 
people from a text’s characters, regardless of the objectivity or gravity 
with which they are presented. As readers, we are able to empathize 
with others, or representations of others, his authorial stance suggests, 
because we are able to extract from their specific, local, and unique ex-
periences values and beliefs we imagine to be more universal. Of course, 
in typically ironic fashion, the universal Eggers sees readers discovering 
is often no more than a convenient stand-in for “like myself.” Just as 
Eggers’s readers can substitute themselves in his life story, they may im-
agine Deng standing in for all Sudanese refugees. However, as the tone 
of Eggers’s “Preface” and the title of his memoir make clear, to make such 
an assumption is to commit an act of absurd egocentricism. 
Rather than attempting to pass off the narrative of What is the What 
as an authoritative document encapsulating Sudanese struggle, Eggers 
challenges the ability of narratives mediated by outsiders, or any single 
representation by anyone, to achieve facticity. In the “Preface,” which 
is the only portion of the book not written by Eggers, Deng points out 
that, although labeled a work of fiction, “it should be noted that all of 
the major events of the book are true … and the world I have known 
is not different from the one depicted within these pages” (xiv). Unlike 
Menchú, whose narrative follows Burgos-Debray’s statement of authori-
zation and who privileges her experience as universal, Deng, when asked 
if he believes What is the What is “representative of the experience of the 
Sudanese refugees in the United States,” responded firmly that “this is 
my story and not the story of the thousands of Lost Boys in America. 
There are many experiences in the story that we all shared … [but] my 
life is different in many ways. This is a story of my life, not everyone’s 
life. We are all different people” (“Interview”). If readers choose to view 
Deng as an emblem for all Sudanese refugees, such treatment is the 
product of assumptions they bring to the text. 
In the book’s supplementary “Reader’s Guide,” Eggers further chal-
lenges readings of his interpretation of Deng’s oral testimony as an au-
thoritative or comprehensive example of Sudanese experience. To help fill 
in the gaps in Deng’s childhood memories, Eggers, like Burgos-Debray, 
made use of other materials. While preparing for the book, though, 
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Eggers travelled to Deng’s hometown, Marial Bai, interviewed other 
Sudanese refugees and aid workers in Ethiopia, Kenya, and the US, and 
researched official documents from the British colonial period as well 
as more recent governments (Larsen). He explains that in order to give 
Deng’s account detail and dialogue, he blended it with his “imagining, 
and reports, maybe a human-rights report or another Lost Boy’s account” 
(Larsen 13). Further, rather than attributing the experiences of others to 
Deng, Eggers depicts him interacting with others who add their voices 
to his first-person recollection of their lives. The result of these dialogues 
is a polyvocal, intertextual narrative. For example, shortly after reaching 
an Ethiopian refugee camp, the Deng of the novel learns about Sudanese 
history in the camp’s school. A youth leader explains official British co-
lonial policy to Deng and his friends. The passage, which the “Reader’s 
Guide” identifies as lifted directly from “a secret Khartoum Dispatch 
from 1945,” appears in the text formatted as a block quotation and in 
italics in order to set it apart from other dialogue (Larsen 11; Eggers, 
What 193). While the narrative uses Deng’s voice, it is not a transcription 
of his conversations with Eggers, nor is it strictly a reproduction of his 
discrete experience. It is a narrative of many people’s experiences stylized 
according to his speaking voice. Rather than solely reconstructing Deng’s 
exploits, Eggers shows him interacting with diverse communities and 
with diverse people who are the justification for his narrative. Although 
Deng is the book’s central figure, he is not its sole contributor. In this way, 
the Deng of What is the What remains metonymic but in a way different 
from the production of static, duplicate individuals. 
The use of Deng’s experience in tandem with the variety of sources 
Eggers lists, because it occurs openly and strategically, prevents readers 
from arriving at the conclusion that the text reveals the “truth” of life 
in Sudan. On the contrary, Deng explains that he feels he is only “an 
example of atrocities many successive governments of Sudan commit-
ted” and later points out that “I haven’t suffered as much as these people 
who have faced the atrocities for the last sixteen years” (Eggers, What 
xiv; Larsen 15). Eggers reminds readers “how complete life is [in Sudan] 
and how it’s not so different in terms of what the people there want, and 
the pleasures of life that they enjoy” (Larsen 15). Eggers’s and Deng’s 
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open recognition of the collage work going into the construction of the 
narrative reveals the degree of mediation between Deng’s lived experi-
ence, which was only a small part of events occurring in the nation, and 
the recorded testimony and makes him limited as a substitute for the 
reader’s contact with the actual place and its population. So, while the 
Deng of What is the What is undeniably fictional, because he admits that 
his own voice and experience are inadequate on their own to narrate the 
national atrocity and Eggers is transparent about his even greater inabil-
ity to know fully what he represents, the text forces readers to recognize 
the presence of many other voices waiting to be heard. It does so because 
Deng “wanted to reach out to others to help them understand Sudan’s 
place in our global community” (xiv). However, unlike Jefferess’s cri-
tique of global citizenship, which imagines the privileged acting as citi-
zens by giving to the poor, Deng depicts a mode of collaboration in 
which “since you and I exist, together we can make a difference” (xv). 
Jefferess warns against simplistic enthusiasm for humanitarian interven-
tion. Campaigns “focusing on what the global citizen must do to or 
for the Other,” he suggests, “rather than conceiving a global ethics in 
terms of understanding our relationship with others,” generate an ethi-
cal obligation premised upon “the symptoms of global inequality and 
not the causes” (34). This one-way relationship, of a transfer of goods 
and services in exchange for permission to continue to turn away from 
suffering and inequality, is precisely the sort of relationship Deng and 
Eggers combat. In addition to Deng’s insistence upon a reciprocal rela-
tionship, one in which he improves the lives of his readers as much as 
they have the potential to do so in Sudan, Eggers’s interrogation of the 
history of conflict in Sudan reveals the scope of the situation in broader 
terms. Eggers finds that contemporary social conditions are the result 
of a Western desire to intervene, namely in colonial mismanagement 
of the British Sudanese colony, which forced the national unification of 
autonomous tribal groups (Eggers, What 192–5). Eggers’s conclusion 
is nearly identical to Jefferess’s—even Westerners with good intentions 
would do well to think carefully before acting. 
On a narrative level, Eggers refutes entirely the notion that the US is 
the utopian refuge and haven for exiles that Grewal worries humanitar-
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ian discourse has created. In the novel, Eggers frames Deng’s narrative 
of his flight from Sudan to Kenya and Ethiopia as a memory he recalls 
from his new home in the US. Deng opens the novel by opening his door 
to “a tall, sturdily built African-American woman” who asks to use his 
phone after experiencing car trouble. Deng lets her in his home, only 
to discover she and a friend are robbing him at gunpoint. After beating 
and tying him up, the gunman, who personifies simplistic metonymic 
assumptions, tells him that because “You’re from Africa, right … that 
means we’re brothers” (5). Deng is “unwilling to agree,” and tries to think 
of a “time when I last felt this betrayed, when I last felt in the presence of 
evil so careless” (5). The robbery took place during the writing of What 
is the What and Eggers recalls “the complaint card that the police had 
given him” was just “a business card with a phone number on it. That 
was the extent of their worry about a gun to the head of an immigrant 
from Sudan. They would not, it was clear, be investigating the crime” 
(Eggers, “Just Boys Walking”). The analogue to violent crime in the US 
that Deng finds is, of course, his childhood of trials in Sudan, though he 
feels his sufferings in the US are more outrageous and inexplicable, since 
here people have more than everything they could possibly need while 
in Sudan there was at least a material explanation for crime. In contrast 
to expectations of “a land without war … a land without misery,” and 
dreams of “peace and college and safety,” Deng and his fellow refugees 
have found themselves in a state of limbo—neither citizens, nor aliens 
exactly. They are not a part of US society and cannot return home. Living 
as exiles, they “have found ways to spend the time,” though not in any 
particularly rewarding way. Deng has “held too many menial jobs,” most 
recently working as a greeter at a health club, and “after five years” of 
study in a junior college, “still do[es] not have the necessary credits to 
apply to a four-year college” (8). Throughout the narrative, Deng pe-
riodically returns to the brutality inflicted upon him by his assailants 
and to everyday indignities experienced in interaction with the normally 
oblivious public. Eggers’s frame story of brutality in the present and in 
the US continually reminds readers that while Deng’s past in Sudan may 
have been horrific, the US is also the site of ongoing violence, exploita-
tion, and racism and is equally in need of social reform.13
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From the project’s inception, Eggers and Deng “agreed that all the 
author’s proceeds from the book would be [Deng’s] and would be used 
to improve the lives of Sudanese in Sudan and elsewhere” (Eggers, What 
xiv). To this end, prior to publication, Eggers and Deng formed a non-
profit organization, The Valentino Achak Deng Foundation, whose 
mission is “to provide educational opportunities for those affected by 
the conflict in Sudan”(539). The majority of the Foundation’s work has 
been carried out in Marial Bai where Deng has built several schools, a 
community center, and a teacher training program. It is always possible 
to make the argument that, because Eggers mediates our interaction 
with Deng, the book, and Eggers, have transformed Deng’s voice, or 
prevented him from speaking fully. Eggers’s willing return of the book’s 
proceeds and Deng’s leadership role with his Foundation, more than 
anything else, however, resists charges that testimonial narratives and re-
sulting transnational activism only enforce paternalistic and imbalanced 
power relations. On the contrary, the two manage to reach a balanced 
partnership. Deng’s testimony does not falsely herald him as a great rev-
olutionary leader, nor the agent of sweeping change. He is not simply 
the object of Western readers’ sympathy, nor a plain indictment of cor-
ruption in the US. Instead, consideration of Deng’s existence requires 
that readers acknowledge his existence alongside their own and reconfig-
ure ideas of community according to a cosmopolitan perspective.
Cosmopolitan Humanitarian Collaboration
The reading of testimonial literature I have described has as its goal the 
production of cosmopolitan, rather than national or multicultural, bonds 
of solidarity and community between narrators and readers. By implicat-
ing a global readership in local activist projects, the testimony narrative 
collapses the imagined boundaries dividing individuals across national 
territorial lines. In contrast to national literatures, which enjoy the du-
bious luxury of pretended insularity, cosmopolitan literatures involve 
encounters between peoples of differing national origins. Deliberately na-
tionalist literatures generally bolster a sense of common identity in order 
to unify a group of people against others, to create a feeling that these 
individuals belong together for some purposeful reason. Cosmopolitan 
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literatures employ contingent commonalities to unify temporarily het-
erogeneous individuals on the basis of involved activism. Whereas the 
imagined bonds of national community come from our interaction with 
static, textual bodies, cosmopolitan communities are often the result of 
spontaneous face-to-face interaction with the shifting cast of people in 
the surrounding environment. Deng makes his readers partners in his 
struggle against the oppressive conditions he has experienced. They do 
not come to resemble Sudanese. To read a narrative like Deng’s, or even 
Menchú’s, is to accept responsibility for the collective action the text en-
visages. Despite the reality that they often focus on superficial qualities, 
which may or may not actually be shared among members of a commu-
nity, national literatures are a powerful unifying force, sometimes even 
capable of contradicting more personal encounters with difference within 
and beyond the boundaries of a community. With cosmopolitan texts, 
however, it is often the case that authors create a sense of discomfort 
and disjointedness by revealing the arbitrariness of national identities 
and by forging bonds between people across national borders rather than 
within them. Political theorist Michael Hanchard describes the forma-
tion of transnational political alliances (his terminology) as a process of 
coagulation. Coagulate political bonds, he explains, “produce coalitions 
that within their immediate environment … increase the likelihood of 
positive political outcomes for the actors involved” and whose “implica-
tions and consequences … are limited to the immediate circumstances 
of the political environment therein” (Hanchard 33–34). In a coagulate 
community, individuals identify in one another temporary commonali-
ties that enable them to address some pressing concern. Cosmopolitan 
communities are not the product of shared cultural appearances, as this 
is something easily manipulated and distorted, but instead come together 
on the basis of active participants’ shared ethical commitment toward one 
another.14 The bonds of politically engaged transnational communities, 
Hanchard’s coagulation model suggests, operate as temporary points of 
identification between individuals in a greater and ongoing process of 
negotiating identity that is distinctly cosmopolitan. This is the sort of 
bond Deng creates when he imagines the presence of his readership and 
which readers renew by engaging with his narrative.
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A cosmopolitan politics expands the boundaries of a community 
beyond the nation with the result that it is no longer defined in terms of 
characteristics distinct to nationality. Literary cosmopolitanism requires 
a similar transformation between author and reader. Under a national 
model like Benedict Anderson’s famous “imagined communities,” in 
which literature arrives in the present unified as a coherent body by 
merit of a mythological and long-ago determined teleological project, 
the authors of works contributing to the collective national identity are 
at a remove from the consuming public whom they in part define. In a 
cosmopolitan community, the author, or in the case of testimony narra-
tive, the narrator and writer, is burdened with the task of recruiting the 
allegiance of an audience assumed to be heterogeneous through a much 
more active act of reaching out across the text. In an essay explaining the 
continuing relevance of fiction, Michael Chabon succinctly describes 
the relationship between authors and readers as predicated upon the 
desire for entertainment. Literary entertainment for Chabon does not 
principally imply the fulfillment of desire, but refers to “[t]he original 
sense of the word,” which is “a lovely one of mutual support through in-
tertwining, like a pair of trees grown together, interwoven, each sustain-
ing and bearing up the other … a kind of midair transfer of strength, 
contact across a void, like the tangling of cable and steel between two 
lonely bridgeheads” (15). The condition of interdependence is height-
ened in testimonial narratives as writers must depend upon their narra-
tors to produce the content of the narrative and narrators likewise must 
trust writers to textualize faithfully and market their oral accounts. The 
testimony, as a cosmopolitan artifact, bridges gaps of received culture 
and lived experience in order to form active connections between oth-
erwise distant and disconnected people. The empathetic bonds formed 
through communication across transnational spaces require readers to 
respond with a reorganization of beliefs and actions. 
Testimony’s assumption of a cosmopolitan audience demands great 
respect on the part of readers and writers alike for the difference of 
experience that occurs across national boundaries. Unlike national lit-
eratures, however, cosmopolitan literatures do not make of such differ-
ences an impassable divide between people. Just as Chabon describes 
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readers and writers in a relationship of imaginative support, Deng finds 
“almost unbelievable strength” in the knowledge that “you [the reader] 
are there” (535). His act of narration collapses the space between him 
and his readers and makes him unable to “pretend that you do not exist” 
just as much as it is “impossible as you pretending that I do not exist” 
(535). Testimony narratives, which insist on the implication of privi-
leged readers in the poverty and suffering they detail, are a good example 
of these partnerships. Cosmopolitan literature, by emphasizing the span 
of human connectedness across formal geopolitical boundaries and by 
continually exposing one national readership to the literary conscious-
nesses or voices of other nationalities, implies a constant ethical concern 
for all people with whom we come into contact. It enables us to real-
ize a humane imagination of others. Cosmopolitan literature demands 
that privileged Western readers entertain voices like Deng’s rather than 
simply turning to literature for edification or the more ordinary, onan-
istic sense of entertainment. 
Notes
 1 Brennan prefers the term internationalism to cosmopolitanism because certain 
kinds of cosmopolitanisms envision “a ‘world state’ not explicitly built in the 
name of any existing power, but factually serving its interests in decently medi-
ated disguise” (83). Internationalism, by comparison, “seeks to establish glo-
bal relations of respect and cooperation, based on acceptance of difference in 
polity as well as culture” (77). His framing of the term has the advantage of 
explicit alignment with subaltern populations and concerns of social reform. I 
have chosen to retain “cosmopolitanism,” however, because, as Beck points out, 
“international” retains an implication of communities segmented along arbitrary 
national lines. For Beck, a cosmopolitan perspective transcends the “‘either in-
side or outside’ that underlies the distinction between national and internation-
al,’” tending towards a recognition of being “‘both inside and outside’” (143). 
Cosmopolitanism allows for an increased fluidity and spontaneity of action that 
is not easily described as constrained in frameworks of national or international 
exchanges. Nationalism, internationalism, and transnationalism depend upon 
the stability of the concept of nation and on the centrality of that concept to 
the identities and purposes of those involved in collaboration. Cosmopolitanism 
lends itself more readily to acts of resistance and compassion because it does 
not force an artificial and inflexible difference between people on the basis of 
nationality, while also refraining from forcing the erasure of difference within 
communities aligned on the basis of common practice or aims. 
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 2 Testimony narratives, because they are theorized within a Central American con-
text typically employ the Spanish term, testimonio. As I am arguing for a broader 
application of the genre, I will instead refer to such texts as testimonies.
 3 Beverley goes so far as to argue that the form’s moment of relevance has passed 
because Latin America is no longer in a state of revolution (“Real Thing” 281). 
His argument may hold true if testimony narratives are theorized geographically 
or according to party politics. 
 4 Braebeck suggests a biography’s emphasis on individual achievement invites the 
reader to “impose his/her identity on top of the hero,” or to fantasize about 
being in the place of, or replacing, the text’s hero (255). For a more extensive 
discussion of biography and autobiography, see Egan.
 5 For a discussion of the definitions and distinctions between modes of legal testi-
mony, see Kusch, 336–8.
 6 Carr places the burden of responsibility for the testimony’s reception princi-
pally upon its writer, whose ethos encourages readers to approach a narrator 
metonymically or allegorically. Beverley, however, associates this sort of writerly 
agency with ethnography and oral history, whereas he finds testimony narratives 
depend heavily on “the intentionality of the narrator” (“Margin” 14). Neither 
critic accords authority for a text’s meaning to its readers, however. 
 7 Stoll suggests that Menchú was not as involved with indigenous groups as her 
narrative suggests. Radical Conservative writer Dinesh D’Souza amplified Stoll’s 
claims that details of Menchú’s biography were elaborated to argue that her en-
tire experience and the history of ethnic violence it chronicles were highly exag-
gerated fabrications. Regarding the comprehensive picture of life Stoll’s notes 
capture, Stephen damningly comments, they cover “his one year in Nebaj, al-
most eight years after Menchú fled” (229). For a more comprehensive treatment 
of the Stoll controversy, see The Rigoberta Menchú Controversy. This volume col-
lects many of the most significant responses to Stoll’s critique, ranging from 
editorials in Guatemala’s national paper, La Prensa Libre, to both defenses and 
rebuttals from academics in the US.
 8 Beverley could just as well describe these represented individuals as otherwise 
subaltern. The narrating subjects of a testimonio would otherwise be considered 
subaltern because, as Spivak argues, the subaltern subject occupies a position of 
being unable to reach an audience with narrative. The subaltern is not exactly 
incapable of speaking to, or addressing, a Western audience, he or she, or a pop-
ulation in toto, is just perceived as not worth paying attention to (Spivak 273). 
The testimonio narrator, because legitimized by a Western academic collaborator, 
becomes no longer subaltern, but remains uniquely able to speak of subaltern 
conditions, striving towards both aspects of representation (darstellung, and ver­
treten) that Spivak discusses, to a Western audience. The practice of testimony 
narrative, its transformation of oral story into text and its mediation between 
readers and witnesses by a Western academic, is not what Spivak finds irksome 
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about privileged individuals’ interventions on behalf of those less so when she 
writes of the problem of subalternity. Instead, it is “the first-world intellectual 
masquerading as the absent nonrepresenter who lets the oppressed speak for 
themselves” (292).
 9 Tierney puts the issue in more literary, less pragmatic terms thusly, “[the] point 
of testimonio … is against the creation of a modernist nostalgia of the romanti-
cized identity. But its purpose is also antithetical to a postmodern notion that 
identity is so fragmented that one can speak for no one other than one’s self and 
that knowing is impossible outside of one’s own experience” (107).
 10 Eaglestone questions the possibility of any non-native writer to create “African 
trauma narratives” out of any motive other than “the eruption of a guilty con-
science” (75). More universally, Spivak finds that collaboration between subal-
tern people and Western writers presents so many opportunities for distortion 
that the subaltern subject can never truly speak openly. Beverley addresses these 
concerns and suggests that testimonial literature, when practiced conscientious-
ly, unlike other forms of international representation, “can serve as both an al-
legorical figure for, and a concrete means of, the union of a radicalized (Marxist) 
intelligentsia with the subaltern” (“Second Thoughts” 4). “Moreover,” he argues, 
“it is a relationship in which neither of the participants has to cancel its identity 
as such” because “[testimonies] have become … a discursive space where the pos-
sibilities of such an alliance can be negotiated on both sides without too much 
angst about otherness or ‘othering’” (4).
 11 This mission statement is taken from the “Voice of Witness” series that Eggers 
inaugurated in order to extend the work he began with What is the What, and 
which he edits along with Lola Vollen through the School of Journalism at 
University of California (Berkeley). Zeitoun (2009), is also a collaborative tes-
timony narrative. Zeitoun describes the unjust treatment of a Syrian-American 
Muslim following Hurricane Katrina and critiques US exceptionalism more di-
rectly by explicitly treating the US as a site of moral and ethical decay in contrast 
with Syria, a nation we consider underdeveloped and hostile. 
 12 See Smith and Watson for an engaging discussion of Eggers’s distrust of bio-
graphical and autobiographical representation.
 13 Eaglestone describes What is the What as a “western-facing text,” and an example 
of a white liberal “guilty conscience,” but reluctantly concedes that Eggers has 
framed the story in a way that prevents excessive glamorization of the US (76, 
75, 80).
 14 In almost direct contradiction to national literatures, which create meaning and 
identity through the exclusion and dismissal of others, Levinas argues that our 
individual identities become meaningful only through our willingness to face 
others as human. He explains, “the past of the other and, in a sense, the history 
of humanity in which I have never participated, in which I have never been 
present, is my past” because, “from the start, the encounter with the Other” 
principally involves “my responsibility for him, that is the responsibility for my 
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neighbor, which is, no doubt, the harsh name for what we call love of one’s 
neighbor,” or “the taking upon oneself of the fate of the other”(115, 103). 
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